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INTRODUCTION

The states of the Americas have a long history of support for
democracy and the human rights related to democracy. They have
expressed this support through treaties, resolutions and declarations, and
these democratic rights have been further interpreted and developed by
the organs of the Organization of American States (OAS). From early,
pre-OAS treaties such as the 1907 Additional Convention to the General
Treaty of Peace and Amity, 1 to the more recent Charter of the
Organization of American States, the American Convention on Human
Rights and the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on
Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
States of the Americas have sought to promote and protect
representative democracy. 2 These treaties protect important democratic
rights and freedoms including those concerning thought, conscience,
opinion, expression, peaceful assembly, association, and participation in
government and public affairs. They also provide the more solid
guarantees that are required to flesh out democracy, including the rights
of citizens to hold, to vote in, and to otherwise take part in, periodic
• Dr. David S. Berry is a Lecturer at the Faculty of Law of the University of the West
Indies, an Advisor to the Attorney General of Barbados on matters of international law and
recently was appointed as an ICSID arbitrator. The views expressed herein are the author's
own and are not to be attributed to any Caribbean state or other entity.
1. See Additional Convention to the General Treaty of Peace and Amity, art. 1, Dec.
20, 1907, 2 AM. J. INT'L. L. SUPP. 229, 229-30 (1908).
2. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, O.A.S.T.S. No. 1, as
amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, Feb. 27, 1967, O.A.S.T.S No. 1-A, OEA/Ser.
A/2(SEPF)Add., by the Protocol of Cartagena de Indias, Dec. 5, 1985, O.A.S.T.S. No. 66,
OEA/Ser.A/41 (SEPF), by the Protocol of Washington, Dec. 14, 1992, 1-E Rev. OEA
Documentos Oficiales OEA/Ser.A/2 Add. 3 (SEPF), and by the Protocol of Managua, June
10, 1993, 1-F Rev. OEA Documentos Oficiales OEA/Ser.A/2 Add.4 (SEPF), the integrated
text
reflecting
all
four
amendments
available
at
http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang=E&sLink=http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ch
arter.html (last visited February 6, 2006) [hereinafter OAS Charter]; American Convention
on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Additional
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, P.A.U.T.S. No. 69. The final three
treaties are each reprinted in General Secretariat to the OAS, Basic Documents Pertaining to
Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/1.4 rev. 10 (May 31, 2004).
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elections. The rights and guarantees in these treaties are further
elaborated in, and may be interpreted by, the American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man. 3
In the last 25 years, however, the Member States of the
Organization of American States have allowed democracy to play an
even stronger role in the operation of the Organization. Several
resolutions, declarations, and an amendment to the OAS Charter have
made a non-democratic transition of government a ground for
suspension of a Member State's right to participate in either the
Organization of American States or Summit of the Americas. This
process started with Resolution 1080 on "Representative Democracy" in
1991,4 and was further grounded and developed in the Protocol of
Washington of 1992,5 the Declaration of Quebec City of 2001,6 and the
Inter-American Democratic Charter of 2001. 7 Through these acts the
3. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Res. XXX, Final Act, Ninth
International Conference of American States, 1948, 43 AM. J. INT'L. L. SUPP. 133, 138
(1949). Although technically non-binding, the Declaration is now recognized as fulfilling
the important role of being an authoritative guide to the interpretation of the phrase
"fundamental rights of the individual" that is found in Articles 3(1) and 17 of the OAS
Charter. Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Within
the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory
Opinion OC-10/89, Jul. 14, 1989, Inter-Am C.H.R. (ser. A) No. 10, paras. 41-47.
4. Representative Democracy, General Assembly of the OAS [hereinafter OAS G.A.]
AG/RES. 1080 (XXI-0/91), June 5, 1991, http://www.oas.org (follow "Welcome"
hyperlink; then follow "Documents & Reports" hyperlink to "Resolutions and Declarations
- AG - General Assembly" and choose "Resolutions Before 1995"; then follow "AG/Res.
1080 (XXI-0/91" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
5. Protocol of Amendments to the Charter of the Organization of American States, Dec.
14, 1992, 33 I.L.M. 1005 [hereinafter Protocol of Washington]. Article 1 of the Protocol of
Washington added a new Article 9 to the OAS Charter, which provides, in part:
A Member of the Organization whose democratically constituted government has
been overthrown by force may be suspended from the exercise of the right to
participate in the sessions of the General Assembly, the Meeting of Consultation, the
Councils of the Organization and the Specialized Conferences as well as in the
commissions, working groups, and any other bodies established.
Id.
6. Third Summit of the Americas, Apr. 22, 2001, Declaration of Quebec City,
http://www.summit-americas.org (follow "The Summit Process" hyperlink; then follow
"Third Summit of the Americas, Quebec City" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
7. Organization of American States, Inter-American Democratic Charter, Sept. 11,
2001, OAS Doc. OEA/SerP/AG/Res.l (2001), 28th Spec. Sess., OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P/
AG/Res.1 (XXVIIl-E/01) (OAS General Assembly) (Sept. 11, 2001), 40 I.L.M. 1289 (2001)
[hereinafter Democratic Charter], available at http://www.oas.org (follow "Welcome"
hyperlink; then follow "Documents & Reports" hyperlink and choose "Democratic
Charter") (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). Articles 20-21 of the Democratic Charter provide:
Article 20
In the event of an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that
seriously impairs the democratic order in a member state, any member state or the
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states of the Americas have accepted that unconstitutional alterations or
disruptions of their democratic orders may provide the grounds for
intense scrutiny, and perhaps intervention, by the OAS or the Summit of
the Americas. 8 Further, this scrutiny may in turn result in suspension of
their rights to participate in those bodies.
This paper briefly examines the practical implications of such
democratic procedures in the Americas. It suggests that despite the
availability of these potentially robust checks on non-democratic
transitions, their meaningful implementation remains problematic.
Focusing on the legal actions taken by the Organization of American
States and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in response to the
departure of Jean-Bertrand Aristide from Haiti in late February 2004,
Secretary General may request the immediate convocation of the Permanent Council
to undertake a collective assessment of the situation and to take such decisions as it
deems appropriate.
The Permanent Council, depending on the situation, may undertake the necessary
diplomatic initiatives, including good offices, to foster the restoration of democracy.
If such diplomatic initiatives prove unsuccessful, or if the urgency of the situation so
warrants, the Permanent Council shall immediately convene a special session of the
General Assembly. The General Assembly will adopt the decisions it deems
appropriate, including the undertaking of diplomatic initiatives, in accordance with
the Charter of the Organization, international law, and the provisions of this
Democratic Charter.
The necessary diplomatic initiatives, including good offices, to foster the restoration
of democracy, will continue during the process. Id.
Article 21
When the special session of the General Assembly determines that there has been an
unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order of a member state, and that
diplomatic initiatives have failed, the special session shall take the decision to
suspend said member state from the exercise of its right to participate in the OAS by
an affirmative vote of two thirds of the member states in accordance with the
Charter of the OAS. The suspension shall take effect immediately.
The suspended member state shall continue to fulfill its obligations to the
Organization, in particular its human rights obligations.
Notwithstanding the suspension of the member state, the Organization will maintain
diplomatic initiatives to restore democracy in that state. Id.
8. For an analysis of the pro-democratic norms of the Inter-American system, see, e.g.,
Stephen J. Schnably, Constitutionalism and Democratic Government in the Inter-American
System, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 155-98 (Gregory H. Fox &
Brad R. Roth eds., 2000); Dinah Shelton, Representative Democracy and Human Rights in
the Western Hemisphere, 12 HUM. RTS. L.J. 353 (1991). For analysis of the Inter-American
Democratic Charter, see, e.g., Timothy D. Rudy, A Quick Look at the Inter-American
Democratic Charter of the OAS: What is it and is it "Legal"?, 33 SYRACUSE J. INT' L L. &
COM. 237 (2005); See also Enrique Lagos & Timothy D. Rudy, The Third Summit of the
Americas and the Thirty-first Session of the OAS General Assembly, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 173
(2002). For an exploration of the difficulties associated with "democratic intervention" by
regional organizations, see e.g., Stephen J. Schnably, The OAS and Constitutionalism:
Lessons From Recent West African Experience, 33 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 263
(2005).
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this paper suggests that regional organizations in the Americas and
Caribbean continue to face both substantive and procedural challenges
in their implementation of the "right to democracy" of the peoples of
the Americas. 9
I.

ARISTIDE'S DEPARTURE

On February 29, 2004, at 6:15 a.m., President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide departed from Haiti on a Boeing 757, escorted by U.S.
soldiers. 10 The events surrounding President Aristide' s departure are
fairly well established. However the meaning of that departurewhether it was a rescue or abduction-remains a subject of deep
controversy.1 1 Importantly, views also differ about the validity of
Aristide' s hasty and informal resignation immediately prior to his
departure. If considered effective, it would serve as a foundation for
future democratic transitions; if considered ille~itimate, it would not
support a democratic, constitutional transition. 1 This latter area of
uncertainty clearly raises the question as to whether there was an
unconstitutional alteration or disruption of the democratic order in Haiti,
a question, which should have been subject to intense scrutiny by the
Organization of American States under the OAS Charter or the InterAmerican Democratic Charter.
II.

THE OAS REACTION: SOFT USE OF THE DEMOCRATIC CHARTER
In this regard, it is useful to compare the reaction of the

9. See Democratic Charter, supra note 7, art. 1. Due to space constraints, this article
cannot examine the Haitian crisis in any significant depth. For a brief overview, see, e.g.,
Garry Pierre, Haiti Awaits Deliverance, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 2004, at A16. For a thorough
evaluation of the performance of the OAS in building democracy between 1990 and 2000
(with a brief note on the events of February 2004), see Yasmine Shamsie, Building 'LowIntensity' Democracy in Haiti: The OAS Contribution, 25 THIRD WORLD Q. 1097 (2004).
10. Lisa Takeuchi Cullen, A Disputed Departure, TIME, Mar. 15, 2004, at 59.
11. Id. See also, Jose de Cordoba & Greg Jaffe, Aristide Leaves Haiti Amid Chaos;
Hundreds of U.S. Marines to Depart for the Country, Joining Peacekeeping Force, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 1, 2004, at A3; see also Jose de Cordoba, Haitian Looters Find Cash Hoard,
Fueling Charges of Corruption; Rotting Dollars Were Stashed Under Aristide 's Mansion;
Rebel Soldiers to Disarm, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2004, at A14.

12. For the official U.S. statement describing a "peaceful and constitutional
succession," see Press Statement, Richard Boucher, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Resignation of
President
Jean-Bertrand
Aristide
of
Haiti
(Feb.
29,
2004),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2004/29990.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). For the view
that Aristide's departure was the culmination of a "prolonged ... chronic coup" at the hands
of the Haitian opposition (the military and the elite), supported by the U.S., see Amy
Wilentz, Coup in Haiti, THE NATION, Mar. 22, 2004, at 5-6. Cf, Yves Engler, A Denial of
Beautiful Dreams, THE ECOLOGIST (May 2004), at 16-21.
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol33/iss1/18
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Organization of American States to the events in Haiti in 2004, with its
more robust reaction to the Venezuelan crisis two years earlier. I3

A.

OAS Reaction to the Venezuelan Crisis in 2002

On April 11, 2002, President Hugo Chavez Frias was removed
Forty-eight hours later, following
from office by coup d'etat.
widespread dissatisfaction with the actions of his replacement, Chavez
was returned to power. I4 The Organization of American States reacted
swiftly to these events. The OAS Permanent Council met on April 13,
and issued a Resolution on the "Situation in Venezuela" which
condemned the "alteration of constitutional order in Venezuela," and
the related acts of violence. Is Further, under the Resolution a special
diplomatic mission was sent to investigate and to help mediate the
situation, and the Permanent Council convoked a special session of the
General Assembly under Article 20 of the Inter-American Democratic
Charter. I6 The General Assembly, in its twenty-ninth special session
considered the report submitted by the Secretary General of the OAS
and issued a resolution on "Support for Democracy in Venezuela."I 7 By
this resolution the General Assembly recognized the end of the
constitutional crisis in Venezuela with the return of Chavez and
expressed satisfaction at the return of the democratically elected
President. Is However the General Assembly also put the Chavez
government on notice that Venezuela, like all OAS Member States,
remained subject to the norms of the Inter-American Democratic

13. For contemporary news reports of the coup and counter-coup, see e.g., Marc
Lifsher, Venezuela's President Chavez Is Ousted in Military Uprising, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12,
2002, at Al; Mary Anastasia O'Grady, Americas: Venezuela Rejected a Coup, but Its
Future Is No Brighter, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2002, at Al 9.
14. For a colorful account of the events, see, e.g., Report presented by the Permanent
Mission of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela for consideration by the Permanent
Council of the OAS, The Current Situation in Venezuela, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P/CPdoc.
3616/02
(May
28,
2002)
(original
in
Spanish),
http://www.oas.org/xxxiiga/english/docs_en/docs_items/cpdoc36 l 6_02.htm (last visited
Dec. 30, 2005).
15. Situation in Venezuela, Perm. Council Res. of the Organization of American States
[hereinafter OAS Perm. Council Res.] CPIRES. 811 (1315/02) (Apr. 13, 2002),
http://www.oas.org/consejo/resolutions/res8 l l .asp (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
16. Id.
17. Support for Democracy in Venezuela, OAS G.A. AG/RES. 1 (XXIX-E/02) (Apr.
18, 2002), http://scm.oas.org/Reference/english/english.htm (Follow "Special Sessions"
hyperlink; then follow "Twenty-ninth Special Session" hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 30,
2005).
18. Id. para. 1.
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Charter, in particular, those set out in Articles 3 and 4. 19 Further, when
the OAS General Assembly met in its fourth plenary session on June 4,
2002, it issued a declaration which reiterated both the "OAS' s
willingness to provide the support and assistance that the Government
of Venezuela requires to consolidate its democratic process," and its
"determination to continue applying, without distinction, and in strict
accordance with the letter and spirit of the Inter-American Democratic
Charter, the mechanisms provided for in the Inter-American Democratic
Charter for the preservation and defense of representative democracy. " 20
The General Assembly also welcomed the national dialogue taking
place in Venezuela and the decision of the Government to establish a
Truth Commission to look into the incident. 21 As can be seen in these
declarations, resolutions, and the related actions of organs of the OAS,
the Organization actively monitored and assisted in the resolution of the
Venezuelan situation, constantly using the Inter-American Democratic
Charter as a reference point.

B.

OAS Reaction to the Haitian Crisis of 2004

In the case of Haiti in 2004, however, the OAS reaction was
muted. The Permanent Council had been keeping the situation in Haiti
on its agenda, as seen in resolutions preceding the incidents of February
29, 2004. In its resolution of February 26, 2004, for example, the
Permanent Council recalled several earlier resolutions, emphasized the
important role of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in helping to

19. Id. paras. 2-4; see also Democratic Charter, supra note 7, arts. 3 and 4. Articles 3
and 4 provide:
Article 3
Essential elements of representative democracy include, inter alia, respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms, access to and the exercise of power in accordance
with the rule of law, the holding of periodic, free, and fair elections based on secret
balloting and universal suffrage as an expression of the sovereignty of the people,
the pluralistic system of political parties and organizations, and the separation of
powers and independence of the branches of government. Id.
Article 4
Transparency in government activities, probity, responsible public administration on
the part of governments, respect for social rights, and freedom of expression and of
the press are essential components of the exercise of democracy.
The constitutional subordination of all state institutions to the legally constituted
civilian authority and respect for the rule of law on the part of all institutions and
sectors of society are equally essential to democracy. Id.
20. Declaration on Democracy in Venezuela, OAS G.A. AG/DEC. 28 (XXXII-0/02)
(June 4, 2002), paras. 1 and 2, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ga02/agdec_28.htm (last
visited Dec. 30, 2005).
21. Id. paras. 3-4.
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resolve the crisis, including the CARICOM Plan, and called upon the
U .N. Security Council "to take the necessary and appropriate urgent
measures" to address the situation. 22 The Permanent Council also
reaffirmed "its support for the OAS Special Mission in Haiti and its
activities in accordance with all relevant OAS resolutions, and, in
particular, its support for the CARICOM initiative, designed to promote
a solution to the situation in Haiti."23 No reference was made to the
Inter-American Democratic Charter in this resolution. Following
Aristide's departure on February 29, 2004, the Permanent Council did
not issue any resolutions regarding the incident, and the OAS General
Assembly only did so during its fourth plenary session several months
later, on June 8, 2004. 24
This latter resolution is fascinating in its treatment of the crisis.
Paragraphs of the resolution's preamble describe Aristide's "abrupt
departure," note the "subsequent questions" surrounding Aristide's
resignation, and emphasize that there "was an alteration of the
constitutional regime, which began prior to February 29, 2004, and
which has damaged the democratic order in Haiti due to the
nonexistence of a functioning parliament or democratically elected
municipal authorities or an independent and free judiciary."25
Cumulatively, these and other statements by the General Assembly in
the resolution should have provided the platform for a robust invocation
of the Democratic Charter, including use of Articles 19-22, as occurred
in the Venezuelan context.
They almost did.
In accordance with the Inter-American
Democratic Charter the General Assembly called for new elections as
soon as possible and requested the OAS Special Mission for
Strengthening Democracy in Haiti to assist with those elections. 26 The
General Assembly also mandated the Permanent Council, in accordance
with Article 20 of the Democratic Charter, to undertake diplomatic
initiatives to foster restoration of democracy in Haiti, and called for "the
rapid normalization of democratic institutions in Haiti consistent with

22. Situation in Haiti, OAS Perm. Council Res. CPIRES. 862 (1401104) (Feb. 26,
2004), para. 1, http://www.oas.org/consejo/resolutions/res862.asp (last visited Dec. 30,
2005).
23. Id. para. 2.
24. Situation in Haiti: Strengthening of Democracy, OAS G.A. AG/RES. 2058
(XXXIV-0/04) (Jun. 8, 2004), http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/ag02528e08.doc (last
visited Dec. 30, 2005).
25. Id.
26. Id. paras. 1-2.
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the Inter-American Democratic Charter."27 However the 'teeth' of the
Inter-American Democratic Charter, the portions of Articles 20-21,
which allow special meetings of the Permanent Council and the General
Assembly in order to suspend a Member State from the exercise of its
right to participate in the OAS, were never utilized. 28
C.

Comparison and Assessment

These OAS reactions to the Haitian crisis were useful, but differed
in two ways from their actions to the Venezuelan coup and countercoup. Firstly, regarding timing, the OAS General Assembly and
Permanent Council did not actively address the Haitian situation until
months later. Secondly, regarding substance, there was no attempt to
establish what actually happened on February 29, 2004. No new fact
finding mission was sent to Haiti, nor is there a record of the OAS
Special Mission in Haiti being asked to clarify the events. This is
important because during and after the Venezuelan incident all parties
emphasized the need to establish an accurate understanding of the
sequence of the events and the actors involved. In addition, the OAS
did not suspend Haiti's voting rights with the provisions of the InterAmerican Democratic Charter.
These differences may be explained in part by the fact that the
United Nations (U.N.) Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the
U.N Charter, issued a resolution on the day of Aristide's departure,
which appeared to legitimize President Boniface Alexandre as the
acting President of Haiti. 29 Chapter VII decisions, of course, are
binding on all U.N. Member States. 30 In light of this, perhaps the OAS
merely recognized Aristide's departure as a fait accompli.
Nevertheless, it is doubtful that this Security Council resolution could
be viewed as prohibiting or otherwise restricting the OAS from
initiating an investigation of the events surrounding Aristide' s
departure, as expressly called for by CARICOM and as envisaged in the
Inter-American Democratic Charter.

27. Id. paras. 4 and 6.
28. Democratic Charter, supra note 7, arts. 20-21.
29. S.C. Res. 1529, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1529 (Feb. 29, 2004).
30. See U.N. Charter art. 25: "The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter." Id.
See also Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
Advisory Opinion, 19711.C.J. 16 (June 21).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol33/iss1/18

8

Berry: Non-Democratic Transitions: Reactions Of The OAS And Caricom To A

Reactions to Aristide's Departure

2005]

Ill.

A.

THE

257

CARICOM REACTION

Need for Investigation ofHaitian Events

In contrast, CARICOM's efforts to establish the truth of what
happened on February 28-29, 2004, is to be commended. 31 Haiti, a very
recent member of the Caribbean Community (from July 2, 2002), is
subject to the democracy-related rights and values of the Charter of
Civil Society, a document adopted by a resolution of the Community's
highest organ, the Conference of Heads of Government. 32 Invoking the
31. CARICOM's Member States are: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados,
Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and
Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago. For further
information about CARICOM, see generally http://www.caricom.org. For an introduction
to the new constituent treaty, the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, see David S. Berry, The
New Caribbean Community: An Introduction to the Institutional Changes in the Revised
Treaty ofChaguaramas, 7 CARIBBEAN L. BULL. l, 1-58 (2002).
32. Although the provisions of the Charter are persuasive rather than binding, they do
exert a normative force over Community affairs, see Charter of Civil Society for the
Caribbean
Community
[hereinafter
The
Charter
of
Civil
Society],
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/secretariat/legal_instruments/chartercivilsocietyresolution.jsp?
menu=secretariat (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). The Charter was adopted at the Eighth InterSessional Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government, on February 19, 1997, by a
resolution of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community. Id.
The Charter guarantees a variety of human rights, including civil and political rights and
economic, social and cultural ones. The relevant portions of Articles 6 and 17 of the Charter
provide:
ARTICLE VI
Political Rights
1. The States shall ensure the existence of a fair and open democratic system
through the holding of free elections at reasonable intervals, by secret ballot,
underpinned by an electoral system in which all can have confidence and which will
ensure the free expression of the will of the people in the choice of their
representatives.
2. The States shall take all appropriate measures to promote and maintain an
effectively functioning representational system, including the holding of regular
public sessions of representatives of the people .... Id.
ARTICLE XVII
Good Governance
1. The States shall adopt and implement all appropriate measures to ensure good
governance which is just, open and accountable.
2. The States recognise and affirm that the rule of law, the effective administration
of justice and the maintenance of the independence and impartiality of the judiciary
are essential to good governance.
7. The States in order to further the participation of the people in the democratic
process shall establish effective systems of ongoing consultations between the
Government and the people.
Article 26, entitled "Implementation," provides: "The States declare their resolve to pay due
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Charter of Civil Society, CARICOM's response to Aristide's departure
was swift. The Community's Conference of Heads of Government met
in an emergency session on March 2-3, 2004, and issued a statement
refusing to recognize the legitimacy of Haitian rebel forces or to
participate in the Multinational Interim Force. 33 The Conference also
expressed clear concern about the non-democratic transition in Haiti as
setting a dangerous precedent, one promoting "the unconstitutional
removal of duly elected persons from office. " 34 Referring to InterAmerican and Caribbean democratic norms, the conference noted "the
contradictory reports surrounding the demission from office of the
constitutionally elected President . . . [and the] assertions made by
President Aristide that he had not demitted office voluntarily," and
called for .a full investigation. 35 Shortly thereafter, Jamaican Prime
Minister Patterson invited Aristide to visit Jamaica on compassionate
grounds to be reunited with his family. 36 This visit was not welcomed
by the interim head of the administration of Haiti, Mr. Gerard Latorture,
who made public statements about the "freezing of relations with
Jamaica" and the "putting to sleep ofrelations with CARICOM."37 This
reaction hardened the position of CARICOM, which did not invite the
Haitian interim administration to attend the next Inter-Sessional
Meeting of the Conference, held on March 29, 2004. 38 As noted in the
Communique issued at the end of that meeting, although Haiti remained
a CARICOM Member State, the Haitian interim administration was not
invited to participate in the meetings of the main organs of the
Community. 39 However, CARICOM maintained its active involvement
with Haiti by reconstituting its Core Group of Prime Ministers on Haiti,
designating a Special Envoy to help advance Community interests, and

regard to the provisions of this Charter."
Id.
33. Press Release, CARI COM, Statement Issued by CARI COM Heads of Government
at the Conclusion of an Emergency Session on the Situation in Haiti (Mar. 3, 2004),
www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres22_04.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Press Release, CARICOM, Statement by the Most Honourable P.J. Patterson,
Prime Minister of Jamaica, on the Hosting of Former President of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand
Aristide (Mar. 11, 2004), www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres34_04.htm (last visited
Dec. 30, 2005).
37. Press Release, CARICOM, Statement on Haiti Issued by the Fifteenth InterSessional Meeting of the Conference of the Heads of Gov't of the Caribbean Cmty. (Mar.
29, 2004), www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres49_04.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
38. Id.
39. Id.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol33/iss1/18

10

Berry: Non-Democratic Transitions: Reactions Of The OAS And Caricom To A

2005]

Reactions to Aristide's Departure

259

°

establishing a Task Force to coordinate assistance. 4 CARICOM also
continued to press for an investigation of the circumstances surrounding
Aristide's departure, first before the U.N., and later before the OASspecifically seeking to invoke Article 20 of the Inter-American
Democratic Charter before the OAS Permanent Council. 41 Despite the
inability of Haiti to participate in CARICOM organs, relations between
the Community and the Transitional Government in Haiti continued and
were described by the CARICOM Secretary General as "close and
productive."42 In fact the return of Haiti to the Councils of CARICOM
was stated to be "a most compelling issue" by the new Chairman of the
Council for Foreign and Community Relations (COFCOR). 43 Yet as of
June 2005 Haiti was still excluded from meetings of CARICOM organs.
There was no evidence of any change in this position by January 2006.
Haiti's continued exclusion was explained by the Chairman of
COFCOR, the Honorable Dame Billie Miller, at the open debate at the
United Nations Security Council on Haiti, in January 2005. 44 In her
statement Dame Miller noted that CARICOM had been actively
involved in Haiti prior to Aristide's removal with three goals:
stabilizing the political situation through power sharing, preventing the
traditional Haitian practice of removing Presidents in order to resolve
political conflicts, and helping the Haitians find a peaceful political
solution which would preserve the rule of law and ensure constitutional
continuity.
Noting the departure of the elected President "in
circumstances still to be elucidated," she explained:
[I]n the view of CARICOM, the fundamental tenets of democratic
practice and behaviour had been compromised. We cannot vacillate on
principle since it is essential to our security as small states. Continuing
violations of the principles laid down in the CARICOM Charter of

40. Id.
41 . Press Release, Conclusion of the Seventeenth Meeting of the Bureau of the
Conference of the Heads Gov't of the Caribbean Cmty. (May 5, 2004),
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres69_04.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
42. Press Release, CARICOM, Sec'y Gen. Denies Media Report on Haiti (June 24,
2004), http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres100_04.htm (last visited Dec. 30,
2005).
43. Press Release, Communique issued at the Conclusion of the Eighth Meeting of the
Council for Foreign and Cmty. Relations (COFCOR) (June 3, 2005),
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres123_05.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
44. Press Release, Hon. Dame Billie Miller, Statement on Behalf of the Caribbean
Cmty. at the Open Debate at the United Nations Sec. Council on the Situation in Haiti (Jan.
12, 2005), http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres19_05.htm (last visited Dec. 30,
2005).
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Civil Society have made it impossible for the Community to receive
representatives of Haiti in its Councils. The interim administration
must be held to internationally recognized standards with regard to
respect for fundamental civil and political rights, due process, and the
rule oflaw. 45

In sum, CARICOM has taken a principled position with respect to
the non-democratic transition in Haiti. It has continued to provide
assistance within Haiti and has constantly kept the Haitian situation on
its agenda. However it has not allowed the Interim Administration to
attend any of the meetings of principal CARICOM organs.
B.

Failure ofProcedural Democracy

Although CARICOM may have emphasized the substantive values
of democracy to a greater extent than the OAS in calling for a full
investigation of the transition, it has been less meritorious in following
its own democratic, procedural requirements. In fact, all of the formal
decisions regarding Haitian participation were taken at meetings of
CARICOM organs without Haiti being present. This is contrary to the
voting provisions in the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, which provide
very limited grounds for exclusion of Member States. 46 Not one of
these grounds concerns non-democratic transitions. 47
Under
CARICOM voting procedures, Haiti could only be excluded from
participation in the Conference if it was either a party to a dispute, or if

45. Id.
46. Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean Community Including
the CARICOM Single Market and Economy, Jul. 5, 2001 [hereinafter Revised Treaty of
Chaguaramas ], http://www.caricom.org/j sp/secretariat/legal_instruments/revisedtreaty.pdf
(last visited Dec. 30, 2005). The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas is not yet in force, but it
has been ratified, and is being provisionally applied, by twelve CARICOM Member States.
See, Protocol on the Provisional Application of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, Feb. 5,
2002,
http://www.caricom.org/j sp/secretariat/legal_instruments/revtreatyprovappl_protocol.j sp?m
enu=secretariat (last visited Jan. 23, 2006). Haiti has signed the Revised Treaty of
Chaguaramas, but has not yet ratified it or signed the Protocol on Provisional Application;
The Bahamas has not yet signed the Revised Treaty; Montserrat is awaiting a decision from
the UK ("entrustment") as to its ability to participate in the Revised Treaty regime. See,
CARICOM Secretariat, Establishment of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy
(updated Aug. 10, 2005), http://www.caricom.org/jsp/single_market/csmekeyelements.pdf
(last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
47. Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, supra note 46, art. 27(2) (allowing suspension of
voting rights of Member States "whose contributions to the regular budget of the
Community are in arrears for more than two years").
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sanctions were being considered against it. 48 It is doubtful whether
Haiti could be excluded from a meeting of one of the other Ministerial
Councils. 49 Since the Charter of Civil Society is not binding, it would
be difficult to argue that a breach of its provisions on democracy or
good governance would merit suspension. As a result, Haiti should
have been invited to attend any CARICOM meeting which discussed
the events of February 2004, and should have been able to present its
case for continued participation. Of course at the end of such a meeting,
the organs of CARI COM could have voted to exclude Haiti's continued
participation, but at least Haiti, as a Member State, would have been
entitled to take part in the deliberative processes.
As a result, even though CARICOM has gone much further than
the OAS in attempting to uphold the full substance of the democratic
rights and values protected by, inter alia, the Inter-American
Democratic Charter, it failed to satisfy its own voting requirements. It
also may have violated the good governance provisions of its Charter of
Civil Society. 50 At the organizational level this produces an ironic
democratic deficit.
CONCLUSION

Both the Organization of American States and the Caribbean
Community have grappled with the difficulties of trying to apply
democratic norms in the extreme situation of a non-democratic change
in government. Both organizations have been partly successful.
However, each organization has failed to uphold some of the democratic
values and procedures established in its own constituent treaty and
related documents. The OAS failed to uphold the substantive values or
apply the full mechanisms of the Inter-American Democratic Charter;
CARICOM failed to uphold the procedural voting rights of its
membership.
Whether either of these failures has had a significant effect upon
the efforts to restore democracy in Haiti is yet to be known. Both
CARICOM and the OAS have continued their active involvement in
Haiti, and each has joined the U.N. in assisting with the preparations for

48. Id. art. 28(4).
49. By allowing issues of "critical importance" to be subject to unanimous voting, the
Revised Treaty implicitly would prevent the exclusion of a Member State from a meeting
where such an issue arises in relation to itself, as would have been the case for Haiti. See id.
art. 29(3).
50. The Charter of Civil Society, supra note 32. Article XVII(l) may be read to extend
to state behavior before the organs of CARI COM. Id.
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elections. 51 But the challenges facing Haiti remain severe. U.N.
Secretary General, Kofi Annan, has suggested that "[a] long term
effort-10 years or more-is needed to help rebuild the police and
judiciary, as well as basic social services such as health care and
education."52 Moreover, the challenge of entrenching fundamental
democratic values within Haiti remains daunting. As this article
suggests, this challenge is not confined to Haiti alone.

51. See e.g., Press Release, CARICOM Task Force, An Indispensable Tool in Regional
2,
2005),
Response
to
Haiti
(June
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/presl 18_05.htm; see also, Press Release, OAS,
OAS and U.N. Working Together to Ensure Elections in Haiti (Jan. 11, 2005),
http://www.oas.org (follow "Press Releases" hyperlink; then follow "2005," "Jan.," and
then "E-006 January 11, 2005" hyperlinks) (last visited Dec. 30, 2005).
52. Kofi A. Annan, In Haiti for the Long Haul, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2004, at A20.
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